This is an attempt at documenting the undocumented NTLM authentication scheme used by M$'s browsers, proxies, and servers (MSIE and IIS); this scheme is also sometimes referred to as the NT challenge/response (NTCR) scheme. Most of the info here is derived from three sources (see also the Resources section at the end of this document): Paul Ashton's work on the NTLM security holes, the encryption documentation from Samba, and network snooping. Since most of this info is reverse-engineered it is bound to contain errors; however, at least one client and one server have been implemented according to this data and work successfully in conjunction with M$'s browsers, proxies and servers.
Note that this scheme is not as secure as Digest and some other schemes; it is slightly better than the Basic authentication scheme, however.
Also note that this scheme is not an http authentication scheme - it's a connection authentication scheme which happens to (mis-)use http status codes and headers (and even those incorrectly).
When a client needs to authenticate itself to a proxy or server using the NTLM scheme then the following 4-way handshake takes place (only parts of the request and status line and the relevant headers are shown here; "C" is the client, "S" the server):
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1: C --> S GET ...
2: C <-- S 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: NTLM
3: C --> S GET ...
Authorization: NTLM <base64-encoded type-1-message>
4: C <-- S 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: NTLM <base64-encoded type-2-message>
5: C --> S GET ...
Authorization: NTLM <base64-encoded type-3-message>
6: C <-- S 200 Ok
The three messages sent in the handshake are binary structures. Each one is described below as a pseudo-C struct and in a memory layout diagram. byte is an 8-bit field; short is a 16-bit field. All fields are unsigned. Numbers are stored in little-endian order. Struct fields named zero contain all zeroes. An array length of "*" indicates a variable length field. Hexadecimal numbers and quoted characters in the comments of the struct indicate fixed values for the given field.
The field flags is presumed to contain flags, but their significance is unknown; the values given are just those found in the packet traces.
This message contains the host name and the NT domain name of the client.
struct {
byte protocol[8]; // 'N', 'T', 'L', 'M', 'S', 'S', 'P', '\0'
byte type; // 0x01
byte zero[3];
short flags; // 0xb203
byte zero[2];
short dom_len; // domain string length
short dom_len; // domain string length
short dom_off; // domain string offset
byte zero[2];
short host_len; // host string length
short host_len; // host string length
short host_off; // host string offset (always 0x20)
byte zero[2];
byte host[*]; // host string (ASCII)
byte dom[*]; // domain string (ASCII)
} type-1-message
0 1 2 3
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
0: | 'N' | 'T' | 'L' | 'M' |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
4: | 'S' | 'S' | 'P' | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
8: | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
12: | 0x03 | 0xb2 | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
16: | domain length | domain length |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
20: | domain offset | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
24: | host length | host length |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
28: | host offset | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
32: | host string |
+ +
. .
. .
+ +-----------------+
| | domain string |
+-------------+ +
. .
. .
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
The host and domain strings are ASCII (or possibly ISO-8859-1), are
uppercased, and are not nul-terminated. The host name is only the host
name, not the FQDN (e.g. just "GOOFY", not "GOOFY.DISNEY.COM"). The
offsets refer to the offset of the specific field within the message,
and the lengths are the length of specified field. For example, in the
above message host_off = 32 and dom_off = host_off +
host_len. Note that the lengths are included twice (for some
unfathomable reason).
This message contains the server's NTLM challenge.
struct {
byte protocol[8]; // 'N', 'T', 'L', 'M', 'S', 'S', 'P', '\0'
byte type; // 0x02
byte zero[7];
short msg_len; // 0x28
byte zero[2];
short flags; // 0x8201
byte zero[2];
byte nonce[8]; // nonce
byte zero[8];
} type-2-message
0 1 2 3
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
0: | 'N' | 'T' | 'L' | 'M' |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
4: | 'S' | 'S' | 'P' | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
8: | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
12: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
16: | message len | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
20: | 0x01 | 0x82 | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
24: | |
+ server nonce |
28: | |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
32: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
36: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
The nonce is used by the client to create the LanManager and NT responses (see Password Hashes). It is an array of 8 arbitrary bytes. The message length field contains the length of the complete message, which in this case is always 40.
This message contains the username, host name, NT domain name, and the two "responses".
struct {
byte protocol[8]; // 'N', 'T', 'L', 'M', 'S', 'S', 'P', '\0'
byte type; // 0x03
byte zero[3];
short lm_resp_len; // LanManager response length (always 0x18)
short lm_resp_len; // LanManager response length (always 0x18)
short lm_resp_off; // LanManager response offset
byte zero[2];
short nt_resp_len; // NT response length (always 0x18)
short nt_resp_len; // NT response length (always 0x18)
short nt_resp_off; // NT response offset
byte zero[2];
short dom_len; // domain string length
short dom_len; // domain string length
short dom_off; // domain string offset (always 0x40)
byte zero[2];
short user_len; // username string length
short user_len; // username string length
short user_off; // username string offset
byte zero[2];
short host_len; // host string length
short host_len; // host string length
short host_off; // host string offset
byte zero[6];
short msg_len; // message length
byte zero[2];
short flags; // 0x8201
byte zero[2];
byte dom[*]; // domain string (unicode UTF-16LE)
byte user[*]; // username string (unicode UTF-16LE)
byte host[*]; // host string (unicode UTF-16LE)
byte lm_resp[*]; // LanManager response
byte nt_resp[*]; // NT response
} type-3-message
0 1 2 3
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
0: | 'N' | 'T' | 'L' | 'M' |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
4: | 'S' | 'S' | 'P' | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
8: | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
12: | LM-resp len | LM-Resp len |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
16: | LM-resp off | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
20: | NT-resp len | NT-Resp len |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
24: | NT-resp off | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
28: | domain length | domain length |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
32: | domain offset | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
36: | user length | user length |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
40: | user offset | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
44: | host length | host length |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
48: | host offset | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
52: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
56: | message len | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
60: | 0x01 | 0x82 | 0 | 0 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
64: | domain string |
+ +
. .
. .
+ +-------------------+
| | user string |
+-----------+ +
. .
. .
+ +-------------+
| | host string |
+-----------------+ +
. .
. .
+ +---------------------------+
| | LanManager-response |
+---+ +
. .
. .
+ +------------------+
| | NT-response |
+------------+ +
. .
. .
+-------+-------+-------+-------+
The host, domain, and username strings are in Unicode (UTF-16, little-endian) and are not nul-terminated; the host and domain names are in upper case. The lengths of the response strings are 24.
To calculate the two response strings two password hashes are used: the LanManager password hash and the NT password hash. These are described in detail at the beginning of the Samba ENCRYPTION.html document. However, a few things are not clear (such as what the magic constant for the LanManager hash is), so here is some almost-C code which calculates the two responses. Inputs are passw and nonce, the results are in lm_resp and nt_resp.
/* setup LanManager password */
char lm_pw[14];
int len = strlen(passw);
if (len > 14) len = 14;
for (idx=0; idx<len; idx++)
lm_pw[idx] = toupper(passw[idx]);
for (; idx<14; idx++)
lm_pw[idx] = 0;
/* create LanManager hashed password */
unsigned char magic[] = { 0x4B, 0x47, 0x53, 0x21, 0x40, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25 };
unsigned char lm_hpw[21];
des_key_schedule ks;
setup_des_key(lm_pw, ks);
des_ecb_encrypt(magic, lm_hpw, ks);
setup_des_key(lm_pw+7, ks);
des_ecb_encrypt(magic, lm_hpw+8, ks);
memset(lm_hpw+16, 0, 5);
/* create NT hashed password */
int len = strlen(passw);
char nt_pw[2*len];
for (idx=0; idx<len; idx++)
{
nt_pw[2*idx] = passw[idx];
nt_pw[2*idx+1] = 0;
}
unsigned char nt_hpw[21];
MD4_CTX context;
MD4Init(&context);
MD4Update(&context, nt_pw, 2*len);
MD4Final(nt_hpw, &context);
memset(nt_hpw+16, 0, 5);
/* create responses */
unsigned char lm_resp[24], nt_resp[24];
calc_resp(lm_hpw, nonce, lm_resp);
calc_resp(nt_hpw, nonce, nt_resp);
Helpers:
/*
* takes a 21 byte array and treats it as 3 56-bit DES keys. The
* 8 byte plaintext is encrypted with each key and the resulting 24
* bytes are stored in the results array.
*/
void calc_resp(unsigned char *keys, unsigned char *plaintext, unsigned char *results)
{
des_key_schedule ks;
setup_des_key(keys, ks);
des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock*) plaintext, (des_cblock*) results, ks, DES_ENCRYPT);
setup_des_key(keys+7, ks);
des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock*) plaintext, (des_cblock*) (results+8), ks, DES_ENCRYPT);
setup_des_key(keys+14, ks);
des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock*) plaintext, (des_cblock*) (results+16), ks, DES_ENCRYPT);
}
/*
* turns a 56 bit key into the 64 bit, odd parity key and sets the key.
* The key schedule ks is also set.
*/
void setup_des_key(unsigned char key_56[], des_key_schedule ks)
{
des_cblock key;
key[0] = key_56[0];
key[1] = ((key_56[0] << 7) & 0xFF) | (key_56[1] >> 1);
key[2] = ((key_56[1] << 6) & 0xFF) | (key_56[2] >> 2);
key[3] = ((key_56[2] << 5) & 0xFF) | (key_56[3] >> 3);
key[4] = ((key_56[3] << 4) & 0xFF) | (key_56[4] >> 4);
key[5] = ((key_56[4] << 3) & 0xFF) | (key_56[5] >> 5);
key[6] = ((key_56[5] << 2) & 0xFF) | (key_56[6] >> 6);
key[7] = (key_56[6] << 1) & 0xFF;
des_set_odd_parity(&key);
des_set_key(&key, ks);
}
As mentioned above, this scheme authenticates connections, not requests. This manifests itself in that the network connection must be kept alive during the second part of the handshake, i.e. between the receiving of the type-2 message from the server (step 4) and the sending of the type-3 message (step 5). Each time the connection is closed this second part (steps 3 through 6) must be repeated over the new connection (i.e. it's not enough to just keep sending the last type-3 message). Also, once the connection is authenticated, the Authorization header need not be sent anymore while the connection stays open, no matter what resource is accessed.
For implementations wishing to work with M$'s software this means that they must make sure they use either HTTP/1.0 keep-alive's or HTTP/1.1 persistent connections, and that they must be prepared to do the second part of the handshake each time the connection was closed and is reopened. Server implementations must also make sure that HTTP/1.0 responses contain a Content-length header (as otherwise the connection must be closed after the response), and that HTTP/1.1 responses either contain a Content-length header or use the chunked transfer encoding.
Here is an actual example of all the messages. Assume the host name is "LightCity", the NT domain name is "Ursa-Minor", the username is "Zaphod", the password is "Beeblebrox", and the server sends the nonce "SrvNonce". Then the handshake is:
C -> S GET ...
S -> C 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: NTLM
C -> S GET ...
Authorization: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAABAAAAA7IAAAoACgApAAAACQAJACAAAABMSUdIVENJVFlVUlNBLU1JTk9S
S -> C 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAACAAAAAAAAACgAAAABggAAU3J2Tm9uY2UAAAAAAAAAAA==
C -> S GET ...
Authorization: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAADAAAAGAAYAHIAAAAYABgAigAAABQAFABAAAAADAAMAFQAAAASABIAYAAAAAAAAACiAAAAAYIAAFUAUgBTAEEALQBNAEkATgBPAFIAWgBhAHAAaABvAGQATABJAEcASABUAEMASQBUAFkArYfKbe/jRoW5xDxHeoxC1gBmfWiS5+iX4OAN4xBKG/IFPwfH3agtPEia6YnhsADT
S -> C 200 Ok
and the unencoded messages are:
Type-1 Message:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 0123456789abcdef 0: 4e 54 4c 4d 53 53 50 00 01 00 00 00 03 b2 00 00 "NTLMSSP........." 10: 0a 00 0a 00 29 00 00 00 09 00 09 00 20 00 00 00 "....)....... ..." 20: 4c 49 47 48 54 43 49 54 59 55 52 53 41 2d 4d 49 "LIGHTCITYURSA-MI" 30: 4e 4f 52 "NOR"
Type-2 Message:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 0123456789abcdef 0: 4e 54 4c 4d 53 53 50 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 "NTLMSSP........." 10: 28 00 00 00 01 82 00 00 53 72 76 4e 6f 6e 63 65 "(.......SrvNonce" 20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 "........"
Type-3 Message:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 0123456789abcdef 0: 4e 54 4c 4d 53 53 50 00 03 00 00 00 18 00 18 00 "NTLMSSP........." 10: 72 00 00 00 18 00 18 00 8a 00 00 00 14 00 14 00 "r..............." 20: 40 00 00 00 0c 00 0c 00 54 00 00 00 12 00 12 00 "@.......T......." 30: 60 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 a2 00 00 00 01 82 00 00 "`..............." 40: 55 00 52 00 53 00 41 00 2d 00 4d 00 49 00 4e 00 "U.R.S.A.-.M.I.N." 50: 4f 00 52 00 5a 00 61 00 70 00 68 00 6f 00 64 00 "O.R.Z.a.p.h.o.d." 60: 4c 00 49 00 47 00 48 00 54 00 43 00 49 00 54 00 "L.I.G.H.T.C.I.T." 70: 59 00 ad 87 ca 6d ef e3 46 85 b9 c4 3c 47 7a 8c "Y....m..F...<Gz." 80: 42 d6 00 66 7d 68 92 e7 e8 97 e0 e0 0d e3 10 4a "B..f}h.........J" 90: 1b f2 05 3f 07 c7 dd a8 2d 3c 48 9a e9 89 e1 b0 "...?....-<H....." a0: 00 d3 ".."
For reference, the intermediate hashed passwords are:
LM authentication in SMB/CIFS
A document on cracking NTLMv2 authentication
Squid's NLTM authentication project
Encryption description for Samba
Info on the MSIE security hole
FAQ: NT Cryptographic Password Attacks & Defences
M$'s hotfix to disable the sending of the LanManager response
A description of M$'s hotfix
Special thanks to the following people who helped with the collection and debugging of the above information:
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